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CONSIDERATIONS IN THE REGULATION OF
BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
I. INMODUCTION

The recent development of recombinant DNA research techniques, with the attendant possibility of genetic manipulation, has
focused public attention on the dangers and benefits of biological
research which carries uncertain risks.' Much of the public discussion of DNA research has dwelt on speculative dangers which could
result,2 but the research also anticipates significant societal benefits. 3
The scientific community is itself divided as to the possible hazards
of such research.4
While recent assessments appear to demonstrate that the potential risks of recombinant DNA research are not as great as was originally feared, 5 the best that can be said is that no one knows. Both
the likelihood of any accident occurring and the degree of harm
6
should such an accident occur remain uncertain.
Both scientists and local communities have attempted to control
recombinant DNA research.7 Although Congress has not yet acted,
several bills have been proposed to regulate the area.8 All of these
' For scientific discussion of recombinant DNA research intelligible to the
layman, see, e.g., Grobstein, The Recombinant DNA Debate, 237 Scrmrc Am.,
July, 1976, at 22; Miller, Recombinant DNA Research, 111 SCL NEws 216 (1977);
Schneider, Genetic Engineering: Threat and Promise, TEcH. REv., Oct./Nov. 1976,
at _; Wade, Genetic Manipulation: Temporary Embargo Proposed on Research,
185 Scr. 332 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Embargo]; Comment, Genetic
Manipulation: Research Regulation and Legal Liability Under International Law,
7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203 (1977).
2 See Cohen, Recombinant DNA: Fact and Fiction, 195 Sci. 654 (1977).
3 See id.
4 See, e.g., Chargaff, On the Dangers of Genetic Meddling, 192 Scr. 938 (1976);
Cohen, supra note 2; Culliton, Recombinant DNA: Cambridge City Council Votes
Moratorium, 193 Scr. 300 (1976); Grobstein, supra note 1; Helling & Allen, Freedom of Inquiry and Scientific Responsibility, 26 BroScI. 609 (1976); Hubbard,
Gazing Into the Crystal Ball, 26 BroSci. 608 (1976); Miller, supra note 1; Roblin,
Reflections on Issues Posed by Recombinant DNA Molecule Technology, 265
ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. ScL 59 (1976); Wade, Embargo, supra note 1; Wade, Recombinant DNA: NIH Sets Strict Rules to Launch New Technology, 190 Scr. 1175
(1975); Watson, An Imaginary Monster, 33 BuLL. ATom. Scr. 12 (1977).
5 See Culliton, Recombinant DNA Bills Derailed: Congress Still Trying to Pass
a Law, 199 Sc. 274 (1978).
6 See sources cited in notes 1-4 supra.
7 See Wade, Gene-Splicing: At Grass-Roots Level a Hundred Flowers Bloom,
195 Scr. 558 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Grass-Roots]. See also text
accompanying notes 10-29 infra.
8 See, e.g., H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (Reps. Rogers and
Staggers); S. 1217, Amend. No. 754, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Sen. Nelson);
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attempts at control have focused solely on DNA research, without
addressing why that technique presents a unique problem. Other
areas of biological research, such as those dealing with pathogenic
bacteria, would appear to present similar dangers.
James Watson, the original discoverer of DNA's structure, commented in the course of a meeting of scientists convened to establish
guidelines for DNA research:
As someone in charge of a tumor virus laboratory, I feel
we are working with something which is instinctively more
dangerous than anything I have heard about here [recombinant DNA] . . . . The dangers involved are probably
no greater than working in a hospital. You have to live
with the fact that someone may sue for $1 million if you
are careless. 9
Dr. Watson was arguing against the need for any control over DNA
research. It is the position of this Comment, however, that afterthe-fact tort remedies such as those he suggests are totally inadequate
when the risks include widespread damage to the public health and
welfare. Some form of institutionaliz d preventive control is essential. The same considerations which have led to the call for control
over the recombinant technique apply equally well to the other
hazardous biological activities mentioned.
Without delving into the scientific debate over research regulation, and without delimiting just what other activities should be
brought under the "biohazard" umbrella, this Comment will explore
legal issues surrounding the regulation of potentially hazardous
biological research. To devise an equitable balance between the
concerns of scientists and those of laymen, the drafting of federal
legislation to create a representative regulatory commission with
broad preemptive powers over local control will be proposed. The
constitutional ramifications of regulation of scientific research will
be examined, as will various administrative procedures which will
take into consideration both public and scientific concerns in the
proposed regulatory framework.
S. 1217, Amend. No. 1713, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (Sen. Kennedy). Specific
provisions of these bills will be discussed infra as relevant. It is highly possible
that some congressional action, most likely in the House, will have taken place by
the time this Comment appears in print
9 Wade, Genetics: Conference Sets Strict Controls to Replace Moratorium, 187
Scr. 931, 933 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Conference].
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WHO SHOULD CONTROL BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH?

A. Scientific Self-Regulation
Assuming that some control over biological research is necessary, it must next be determined where responsibility for exercising
that control should rest. One possible option is to leave regulatory
decisionmaking to the scientific community itself. This was the
initial response to the DNA question, and remains the major current solution to control of other biohazards.
The initial impetus for regulation of recombinant DNA research came in an open letter to the scientific community in Science
magazine, 10 calling for a worldwide moratorium on certain "high
risk" experimentation until the potential hazards could be evaluated
or adequate safeguards developed. 1 Eight months later the letter
was followed by a major international conference, organized by
prominent researchers, at the Asilomar Conference Center in California; 12 the Asilomar conference resulted in the lifting of the total
voluntary ban, replacing it with a set of safety conditions for a
variety of future experiments, along with a continued voluntary ban3
on research determined to be hazardous under any circumstancesJ.
The guidelines formulated at Asilomar became the basis for
regulations promulgated by the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
to govern federally funded research. 14 These guidelines provide for
both physical and biological containment requirements of increasing
severity depending on the perceived level of danger. The physical
guidelines ensure that no dangerous organism will escape the laboratory; the biological requirements ensure that no organism which
does escape will be able to survive outside the laboratory.' 5
10 Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules, Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules, 185 Scr. 303 (1974). Among the eleven signatories of the
letter were Nobel laureates David Baltimore and James D. Watson. Simultaneously
with its appearance in Science, the letter was also published in 11 Pnoc. NAT'L
AcAD. Sci. USA 2593 (1974) and in the British science magazine, Nature, 250
NATURE 175 (1974).
"1 Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules, Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules, 185 Scr. 303 (1974).
12 Wade, Conference, supra note 9.
As with the moratorium, the guidelines developed at Asilomar had
13 Id.
only moral, and not legal, force. They were nonetheless followed by the scientific
community. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 1; Wade, Recombinant DNA: CamFor international
bridge City Council Votes Moratorium, 193 ScL 300 (1976).
responses, see Leeper, British Biologists Urge Adoption of Genetic Research Guidelines, 25 BroSCL 594 (1975); Leeper, World Body to Monitor Genetic Experiments,
26 BioSct. 740 (1976); No DNA Rules from WHO, 26 BroSc. 740 (1976).
1441 FED. Ra.
15 Id.

27,911-17 (1976).
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Both scientists and the general public were consulted as NIH
struggled to devise appropriate guidelines.16 A public hearing was
held to review the proposed guidelines before a specially assembled
committee,'7 and the opinions of public interest groups were solicited
as well.' 8 The meeting was significant because it gave nonscientists
an opportunity to comment for the first time on the procedures
developed by the scientific community for handling recombinant
DNA.19
Even though NIH sought public participation in the formulation of its guidelines, the result remained essentially scientific selfregulation, as NIH itself sponsors the research. It has been suggested that the NIH regulations were motivated primarily by
scientists' self-interest,20 and as such were unresponsive to wider
21
societal concerns.
A further problem with regulation by NIH is that their guidelines restrict only research conducted with federal funding; 22 private industry, which is becoming increasingly involved in DNA
research, remains unregulated.

23

See Roblin, supra note 4.
17 WVade, Recombinant DNA: Guidelines Debated at Public Hearing, 191 SOL
834 (1976). Included on the panel was David Bazelon, Chief Judge of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id.
l8 Id.
19 Id.
20 Wade, Recombinant DNA: A Critic Questions the Right to Free Inquiry,
194 SOL 303, 305 (1976) (biologist Robert Sinsheimer charges that as only the
interests and concerns of the scientific community were involved in the promulgation of the guidelines, the interests of the rest of society were ignored).
21 Grobstein, Recombinant DNA Research: Beyond the NIH Guidelines, 194
Scr. 1133, 1134 (1976).
221d.
23 See Wade, Grass-Roots, supra note 7. All the major pharmaceutical companies are interested in recombinant techniques, and at least six are actively engaged in DNA research, as are at least two smaller companies. Id. 559. The
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association has been advocating voluntary compliance with the NIH guidelines, but has recently been leaning toward some form of
actual regulation. Id.
One measure of the interest of drug companies in this type of research is
evidenced in the fact that Miles Laboratories sponsored a symposium on "The
Impact of Recombinant Molecules on Science and Society" at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology as early as the summer of 1976. Schneider, supra note 1.
A possible mode of regulating commercial research is through the patent
process. The Patent and Trademark Office has begun giving accelerated processing
to patent applications for gene-splicing techniques if the applicants abide by NIH
regulations. However, the Patent Office allows deviation from those regulations to
the extent that the NIH disclosure requirements need not be met if disclosure would
prejudice foreign patent rights. This exemption has been severely criticized. Wade,
Grass-roots,supra note 7.
Reliance on the patent process to control commercial research and applications
of DNA technology is risky at best, because it assumes that all companies will seek
patents; industrial research, as opposed to commercial applications, would remain
unregulated.
16
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Even though scientists may be in the best position to assess the
probability of certain dangers occurring, they are no better able
than the layman to judge the significance of these hazards and the
social costs associated with them, or to strike a balance based on
difficult value choices. 24 In fact, because of the high value placed
by the scientific community on unrestricted research, that community is perhaps less competent to judge the position research
should hold in the community at large. Because research into recombinant DNA and other equally dangerous procedures has the
potential of greatly affecting society as a whole, the public, or representatives of the public, must have a voice in the extent and nature
of regulation. To the extent the public has been excluded from
meaningful participation in regulatory procedures, scientists are
being given a monopoly over basic value and policy decisions beyond their expertise.2 5
B. Federal or Local Control?
Once it has been decided that some form of governmental control over biological research is necessary, the next major issue is
whether such regulation should be exclusively federal, or whether
there should be some opportunity for local control.
The most publicized effort to establish local control occurred
when Cambridge, Massachusetts imposed a three-month moratorium
on research which would have required the highest levels of containment under the NIH regulations, and established the Cambridge
Laboratory Experimentation Review Board, which held hearings on
the advisability of recombinant DNA research at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 26 The Board,
composed of both scientists and laymen, eventually recommended
24 Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 791, 799 n.31 (1975). See also Martin, The Proposed "Science Court,"

75 Micn. L. RIv. 1058 (1977).

25 This conclusion is strengthened by recent NIH actions. Apparently in response to pressure from the scientific community, NIH has proposed revised, somewhat less stringent regulations for DNA research. 42 Fed. Reg. 49,596-605 (1977).
The process of revision was severely criticized as not providing sufficient public
participation procedures. Wade, Gene-Splicing Rules: Another Round of Debate,
199 ScL 30 (1978).
26 Culliton, supra note 4; Wade, Gene-Splicing: Cambridge Citizens OK Research but Want More Safety, 195 Sc. 268 (1977). The moratorium was in "good
faith" and not enforceable, as the Cambridge City Council lacked authority to
decree a binding ban: the health commissioner had the power to ban the research
by declaring it illegal, but, at the time of the moratorium, this position was vacant.
Culliton, supra note 4.
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guidelines, passed into law by the City Council early in 1977,27
which were slightly more restrictive than those established by NIH. 28
Although the Cambridge response 2 9 to the problem of uncontrolled scientific experimentation within its borders was a useful and
legitimate one, local control is not the most appropriate long-term
solution. There are compelling reasons for the federal government
to totally preempt this field.
A major problem with local control is that other localities may
not be as "enlightened" as Cambridge.3 0 They may not, for example,
give sufficient deference to the need for scientific advice before regulatory action is undertaken, but may instead respond to popularized
scare tactics and uninformed public hysteria. Decisionmaking may
become entirely politicized. Even assuming access to scientific information is available, states may differ in their "readiness to accept
new developments, particularly when these developments involve
scientific matters that have a direct impact on social and even religious commitments." 31 It is also questionable whether a system
of piecemeal regulation would be effective at protecting the public,
for microbes fleeing from a low-safeguard locality are unlikely to
recognize the political boundary of an adjacent high-safeguard
jurisdiction.
Beyond the question of effectiveness, lack of preemption would
frustrate the justifiable objective of a uniform national policy on
regulation of biohazards. Scientific research depends upon the
ability of scientists to replicate one another's research. With varying standards from locality to locality, this would become extremely
difficult, leading researchers to congregate in those localities with
the least restrictive regulations.3 2 Furthermore, it is not reasonable
27

Cambridge Resumes Genetic Research, 111 Scr. NEws 103 (1977).
The Cambridge Experimental Review Board, 33 BULL. ATom. ScL 23 (1977).
For the responses of other localities, see Wade, Grass-Roots, supra note 7.
30 See Culliton, supra note 4, at 301. The Board itself believed federal control
to be called for. Cambridge Experimental Review Board, supra note 28.
3' Grad, Legislative Responses to the New Biology, Limits and Possibilities,
15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 480, 486 (1968).
32
Another problem could occur if, for example, a town were to approve a
28
29

variety of research projects for its medium-containment facility, based on the sup-

position that a certain organism possessing a high degree of biological containment
is available for use by experimenters, and the federal agency in charge of allocating these microorganisms then adopted a policy of making them available only
to high containment facilities. The entire basis on which the local community
approved its plan would be eviscerated. As a result, researchers would have to
utilize a different organism, not approved by the local agency, or delay or terminate
projects for which resources have been allocated.
The unworkability of a federal-state framework is further highlighted by the
problems which would be likely to occur if more than one federal agency were to
have a role in research regulation. "Cross" preemption results when two or more
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to believe that local regulators would have access to the same quality
of information as would exist for a national body. 33 The area to be
regulated is an uncertain and constantly changing one, and the
federal government is presumably best equipped to keep abreast of
the most recent scientific developments. If localities were to be
allowed to regulate individually, a situation could arise in which the
local restrictions would be either too restrictive or not restrictive
enough for an optimal level of research, because of the time lag in
receipt of adequate scientific input. In the latter situation, an unreasonable health risk would be created; in the former, valuable
research would be unnecessarily curtailed. For these reasons, scientists tend to strongly favor a broad preemption requirement. 34 They
fear that "a local option would set a dangerous precedent for the
regulation of basic research in a manner that might deprive society
of substantial future benefits." 35
Despite strong political opposition to broad federal preemp3
tion, 6 many of the bills currently before Congress on the subject of
DNA regulation address the question of preemption. Both the
House bill proposed by Representative Rogers and the Senate bill
proposed by Senator Nelson provide for federal preemption of local
regulation.3 7 The House bill, however, makes an exception for
local laws which are more stringent than federal requirements and
which are "necessary to protect health or the environment." 8s
Senator Nelson's bill contains the same provision, but adds that the
more stringent local requirement must also be "required by compelling local conditions." 39
While not total preemption, the solution offered by the Rogers
and Nelson bills may be acceptable. All local regulations are preempted unless specifically approved by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare. This aspect of the provision has been defended on the ground that "[w]ith the Secretary involved, a state
federal agencies have equally strong preemptive powers over state regulation on
the same subject. The potential dangers of this type of framework have been well
illustrated in the regulation of air pollution. See Guilbert, The Relationship
Between State and Federal Regulation of Air Polluting Energy Sources in Oregon,
54 Oni. L. REv. 525 (1975).
33 Id.530.
34 See Gene Legislation: NAS Urges Caution, 111 SCL NEws 293 (1977).
35d.
36
Wade, Gene Splicing Preemption Rejected, 196 Scr. 406 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Wade, Preemption].
37 H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 106 (1978); S. 1217, Amend. No. 754,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 484 (1977).
38 H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 106(b)(2) (1978).
3Q S. 1217, Amend. No. 754, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 484(b)(-2-) (1977).
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cannot just go ahead and write a more stringent law on its own." 40
By requiring federal approval and a showing of necessity for the
more restrictive local regulation to be permitted, the danger of curtailing valuable experimentation would be minimized.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH REGULATION

A threshold question to be addressed before enacting any regulatory scheme is the constitutionality of such action.41 While no
case law deals directly with the question of how much, if any, effect
the first amendment has on governmental regulation of scientific
research, it is nevertheless vital to draft regulations with the first
amendment in mind, primarily to avoid potential problems of overbreadth. Regulations directed to the dissemination of knowledge
gained from particular research would most likely face closer constitutional scrutiny than would regulations aimed directly at research
42
procedures and the dangers potentially arising from their use.
Scientific research fits uneasily within the traditional confines
of first amendment doctrine. Conducting an experiment is clearly
not an example of pure speech. Nor does it appear to be a physical
manifestation of a nonverbal statement. It is not the typical case of
a silent attempt at communication, as there is no obviously expressive content, even in the relatively broad senses typically recognized
43
by the Supreme Court.
40

Wade, Preemption, supra note 36 (comments of an NIH official).
This discussion will focus on the first amendment implications of governmental control over biological research. Other challenges to state regulation are
possible, however. In the case of governmentally funded research especially, it
could be argued that regulation of only one type of potentially dangerous research,
such as DNA experimentation, violates the equal protection or due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. For an examination of this claim in a related research context, see Comment, Governmental Control of Research in Positive Eugenics, 7 U. MiCir. J.L. REF. 615, 628-29 (1974). The thrust of the equal protection claim is lessened if, as this Comment advocates, all research presenting a
biological hazard is controlled together.
42 Regulation of information dissemination might be attempted in order to
avoid potential public hysteria based on popular interpretation of and speculation
about the uses of newly discovered knowledge.
43 See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (peaceful picketing
assimilated to the general right of free speech. This finding was later cut back
when the picketing involved any questions of violence, Milk Wagon Drivers Union
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941), or if the picketing constituted illegal
economic coercion under valid state law, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490 (1949)); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (destruction
of draft card assumed to include an element of expression); Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of black armband a symbolic act within meaning of free speech clause); Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405 (1974) (given the context, taping a peace symbol to an American
flag was a form of communication and a species of protected expression. Cf. West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (refusal to salute the
41

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

1428

[Vol. 126:1420

On the other hand, however, strong arguments for viewing regulation of scientific experimentation as implicating first amendment
interests can be made. DNA research is impossible without experimentation; advances in knowledge about uncertain scientific areas
generally depend upon research as well as pure thought. 44 Because
pure thought is not regulable, and regulation cannot therefore be
justified based upon the content of what is being thought about, it
should not be possible to circumvent this restriction on regulation
by removing the means to accomplish an unwanted thought. For
this reason, experimentation might qualify for that protection
granted to "the process of discovering truth." 45 Thomas Emerson
has written that by enacting the first amendment to the Constitution,
the founders were providing protection for the fundamental societal
interest in truth-seeking. Today, he writes, we conceive of this interest as "advancing knowledge" or "reaching the better decision." 46
According to Emerson, while the first amendment developed in the
political realm, the truth-seeking principle has its roots in the scientific method. The process of discovering the political "truth"
operates upon the same principles as those that guided the
men of science: the refusal to accept existing authority; the
constant search for new knowledge; the insistence upon exposing their facts and opinions to opposition and criticism;
the better,
the belief that rational discussion produces
47
though not necessarily the final, judgment.
Moreover, even though the concern for factfinding and the
"marketplace of ideas" has been traditionally associated with the
political system, 48 there is no reason to place such a limiting scope
upon the first amendment. There is evidence that the founders did
not intend freedom of expression, which included information exchange, to be limited to politics alone. It has been suggested that
the fact that freedom of conscience was protected in the religion
clause indicates that "the scope of the constitutional protection was
flag involved free expression); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)
(unconstitutional to ban use of red flag, as it is a form of nonverbal political
expression).

44 See Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code: JurisprudentialConundrums, 64
GEo. L.J. 697, 732 (1970).

45 Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment,
125 U. PA. L. Ruv. 737, 740 (1977).

46 Id. 741.
47id.

48See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (constitution mandates free and robust debate about public officials).
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intended to extend to religion, art, science, and all areas of human
learning and knowledge." 49 Justice Douglas has similarly averred
that "the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First
Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge." 5
Furthermore, recent cases granting protection to commercial
speech 51 indicate that the present Court will not define the protections of the first amendment so narrowly as to totally exclude the
52
freedom of scientific inquiry.
Another potential source of protection for scientific research is
the constitutionally-based concept of academic freedom. In Sweezy
53 the Supreme Court noted that:
v. New Hampshire,
[t]o impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders
in our colleges and universities would imperil the future
of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be
made.. . . Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere
of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.54
The school as a special place for first amendment purposes has been
reaffirmed and given support in such later cases as Keyishian v.
49 Emerson, supra note 45, at 742.
50 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). See Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 24 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting). "The right to know, to converse
with others, to consult with them, to observe social, physical, political and other
phenomena abroad as well as at home gives meaning and substance to freedom of
expression and freedom of the press." Id. Zemel involved the denial of a passport
to travel to Cuba, despite the assertion of a need to search for knowledge. This
holding may imply that there are limits, albeit indistinct ones, to the principle of
free speech as a search for truth and knowledge. It is unlikely, however, that the
scientist would face the same barriers as the petitioners in Zemel who were feared
to have invented a makeshift excuse in order to obtain a passport to an otherwise
prohibited country. A scientist researching DNA, claiming that an experiment was
necessary to further his knowledge, would be in a much more believable position.
Further distinctions between Zemel and the typical biological research situation lie
in the traditional governmental interest in foreign policy and national security implicated in Zemel but not necessarily present in the research case.
n E.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
426 U.S. 748 (1976).
52 It has also, however, been argued that only expressly political speech and
expression are protected by the first amendment See Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 INn. L.J. 1 (1971).
53

354 U.S. 234 (1957).

54

Id. 250 (emphasis added).
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Board of Regents,55 Whitehill v. Elkins,5 6 and Shelton v. TuckerP
While this doctrine has been slow to develop, it does "give promise
that the principles and practices that enable institutions of learning
and research to function as social critics and innovators may be entitled to a special place under the protective umbrella afforded by
the first amendment." 58
A major difficulty in relying on a doctrine of academic freedom
to create protection for scientific experimentation is that the cases
in which the doctrine was found were not decided solely on this
ground. While the cases say that the academic context makes closer
scrutiny of constitutional claims imperative, the decisions would
probably have been the same regardless of the academic context, for
they all involved an issue of obvious speech infringement either by
a loyalty oath requirement or an investigation into subversion. 59
Another problem of using the academic freedom doctrine to
govern the experimentation case is that there the regulation does not
so obviously infringe upon speech. In Whitehill, Sweezy, Shelton,
and Keyishian, the restraints involved teaching, either directly or indirectly. As teaching primarily involves speech, traditional restraints
55385 U.S. 589 (1967).
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom.
Id. 603.
56389 U.S. 54 (1967).
57 364 U.S. 479 (1960). "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms
is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools." Id. 487. But
see Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (teaching fellow cited for
contempt for refusing to answer questions about communist party membership.
"We think that investigatory power in this domain is not to be denied Congress
solely because the field of education is involved." Id. 129.).
58 Emerson, supra note 45, at 746.
59
In Sweezy, New Hampshire sought to question the petitioner about his
allegedly subversive activities, including certain lectures he had given at the university. The case turned on the legislature's failure to delegate authority to ask
particular questions to the attorney general, who was conducting the investigation
on their behalf. The academic freedom principle was said to make it less likely
that the legislature sought to inquire into such a highly protected area. Keyishian
found a state employment loyalty oath unconstitutionally vague, and also presented
a question of dismissal of teachers for communist party membership alone, with no
scienter requirement. The vagueness was said to be worse for appearing in an
academic setting, but there is no reason to believe that the same oath would not
have been equally vague and unconstitutional in another setting. Whitehill was
also a loyalty oath case. Shelton involved a state requirement that teachers list
the organizations to which they belonged. Even though the state had an interest
in regulating its teachers, the scope of the Arkansas statute impinged upon the
freedom of association. The fact that teachers were involved was again not
%
determinative.
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on curbing speech have come into play when teaching has been
limited. The same result would probably not occur in the case of
experimentation regulation, however, because courts would not
consider it to be infringement of speech or even expression on an
academic freedom theory alone. Consequently, where research is
concerned, the academic freedom ideal as a basis for constitutional
decisionmaking would exist in something of a first amendment
vacuum, dependent on a particular judge's desire or ability to see a
relationship between experimentation and first amendment interests.
In addition, it is not clear that academic freedom, even if it did
exist as a constitutional test in and of itself, would apply to research
only tangentially affiliated with universities or colleges or to commercial research totally outside the academic community. Sweezy,
Keyishian, Shelton, and Whitehill were limited on their facts to
encroachments on first amendment interests occurring within high
schools, colleges or universities. 60 However, the scope of the quoted
language suggests a broader freedom to inquire. Indeed, Justice
Douglas has also included "freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought,
and freedom to teach," as within the freedom of speech. 61 Yet,
Douglas' position on the breadth of the first amendment is not
62
certain to sway the current members of the Court.

It might also be argued that governmental regulation of scientific experimentation infringes upon some first amendment interest
in "personal self-fulfillment." 63 While it is conceivable that a scientist might claim the right to research as an expression of his "inner
self," this claim is not particularly persuasive. As Emerson points
out, it would be very difficult in a case of this nature to distinguish
protected expression from regulable action. 4 Biological research is
especially inappropriate for protection on this ground. Unlike most
of the examples enumerated by Emerson,6 5 the decision to do research is not made within some sphere of privacy; 66 the research is
externally funded and carries both social costs and benefits.
60 Sweezy and Keyishian involved colleges; Shelton and Whitehill, high schools.
61 381 U.S. at 482.
62

For a general discussion of Justice Douglas' views on the first amendment,

see Symposium in Honor of Mr. justice Douglas, 74 COLOm. L. REv. 341 (1974).
63
Emerson, supra note 45, at 758.
64 Id. 759.
65 Emerson writes that the protection for "personal self-fulfillment" might prohibit "governmental interference with the expression of the individual personality as
shown through one's life style-one's clothing, hair style, appearance, mode of
living, sexual preferences, career or lack of career." Id. 758.
66 The privacy ' aspect of the first amendment was articulated by justice Douglas in Griswold v.

.(1965).
onnectfcut, 381 U.S. 479

For an examination of an

analogous constitutional interest expressed in due process terms, see Hindes, Morality
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On balance, despite the weaknesses of the academic freedom
and personal self-fulfillment arguments, it is likely that the courts
will be persuaded to afford some first amendment protection to
scientific research, perhaps on a truthseeking theory. Assuming this
protection exists, governmental regulation would then have to meet
6 7 which held that:
the test enunciated in United States v. O'Brien,
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined
in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
government interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedos. ...
. [W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendthan is essential to the furtherment freedoms is no greater
68
ance of that interest.
The application of this test to regulation of experimentation occurring in areas of uncertain scientific risk, such as recombinant DNA
research, leads to the conclusion that the constitutionality of such
regulation will be upheld.
The first requirement of the O'Brien test-that of the constitutional power of the federal government to regulate-is met in the
case of biological experimentation by reference to the commerce
clause.69 The case law requires "a close and substantial relationship"
between interstate commerce and the business or subject of regulation. 70 Courts have construed this relationship liberally.7 1 The
possible consequences of unregulated recombinant DNA research
conducted in any one location on health, agricultural productivity,
and the environment nationwide, without regard for state borders,
suggest the ready applicability of the commerce clause in this
context.7 2
Enforcement Through the Criminal Law and the Modern Doctrine of Substantive
Due Process, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 344 (1977).
67391 U.S. 367 (1968).
68 Id. 376-77.
69 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
70 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

71 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
72 See Comment, supra note 41, at 631. See also Balmer, Recombinant DNA:

Legal Responses to a New Biohazard, 7 Ez,'vr'L L. 293, .308 (1977).
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The O'Brien requirement of a substantial governmental interest in regulation is also present in the context of a scientific methodology possessing the potential for danger. The interest is substantial
to the extent that it could be determined that a particular set of
experiments might constitute a danger to human life or health. In
Roe v. Wade,73 the Supreme Court spoke of a "state's important and

legitimate interest" in the health of a mother seeking abortion as
well as in the potential life of the child, both of which at a certain
point could be sufficiently substantial to outweigh the mother's
privacy interest. It is not clear what the necessary quantum of
danger or the requisite degree of certainty of danger would have to
be in order to outweigh the pursuit of knowledge through experimentation. Yet it is at least worth speculating that courts, unequipped to assess the intricacies of scientific research and regulation, might defer to legislative or administrative judgments about
danger in this area.
Given that the motivation for regulation would be to protect
the populace and the environment, and assuming that the governmental proscription would be clearly and specifically limited to the
regulation of the process of experimentation and not to the underlying search for knowledge, courts could not be expected to find
that the governmental interest was related to the suppression of expression. Indeed, this third prong of the O'Brien test is somewhat
problematic, as it is unlikely that governments would deliberately
design legislation which would run afoul of the first amendment.
The fourth and final requirement of the O'Brien formula is
perhaps the most significant for scientists concerned about government regulatory activity. This form of a least restrictive alternative
test 74 holds out the promise that the government will be allowed to
regulate only those areas of research where danger to the public can
be shown. The difficulty here, once again, is that courts are not
competent to decide these issues; given the enormous uncertainty
concerning the dangers of DNA research, judges will have no better
grasp of the risks involved than will the regulators themselves. Such
research regulation also carries an element of policy decisionmaking
beyond the function of the judiciary. A small risk of great danger
73410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). While finding a privacy right to procure an
abortion, the Court nonetheless permitted some governmental regulation.
74 Shelton v. Tucker also involved a least restrictive alternative analysis. 364
U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960) (citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)). "Even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved." 364 U.S. at 488.
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might well justify regulation as much as would a greater risk of a
smaller danger. Thus deference should be given to those best able
to make this policy decision. It is likely that the need for regulation
will be broadly interpreted.7 5
The foregoing suggests that while scientists may be able to
draw support from the first amendment in their desire to protect
their research, the degree to which the government will be prevented
from regulating experimentation will be limited because of judicial
deference to official assessments of danger and official policy judgments as to the balance of risks and benefits of regulation.
The government will be less able constitutionally, however, to
curb dissemination of information about the experiments. Because
the activity constitutes pure speech and not merely conduct with a
speech element, scientists will be able to rely on more restrictive first
amendment tests. There will also be less justification for official
restraint on such speech. The major justification for regulation of
experimentation is that of the potential danger it represents. Merely
talking or writing of the experiment does not present the same
degree of danger, although it could be argued that the possibility of
public fear or hysteria represents such a danger. Such a remote
eventuality, however, would be unlikely to succeed as a justification
for regulation of pure speech.
Therefore, to justify any restriction on information dissemination, the government would have to show a clear and present danger
-an intentional incitement to lawless action. 76 It is difficult to envision the dissemination of information about a scientific experiment
as incitement to commit an illegal act. There would thus appear
to be no governmental justification for suppressing speech which
disseminates knowledge in this context, and, assuming that courts
would apply traditional first amendment tests to scientific speech,
75
Emerson has been extremely critical of O'Brien, calling it a "disaster" for
its failure to balance. Emerson, supra note 45, at 749-50. He feels that the proper
test would be to determine whether the conduct was primarily expressive or action;
if expressive it should be granted the full protection of the first amendment. The
research concerned with here would constitute action rather than expression, and
under Emerson's test, too, would be regulable.
76
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the Court summarized a
large body of free speech law by stating:
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and full press do not permit a state to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. 447. For a discussion of Brandenburg, which involved a Ku Klux Klan rally in
Ohio, see Comment, United States v. Ke]ner: Threats and the First Amendment,
125 U. PA. L. Rlv. 919, 937 (1977).
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the government would find it nearly impossible to curb this type of
expression. In the vast majority of circumstances, DNA researchers
can expect to engage unfettered in their professional discourse. The
experimental process itself, however, as discussed previously, will
undoubtedly face regulation, at least insofar as is deemed necessary
to protect the public health and environment. Legislation enacting
such regulation must be carefully drawn to avoid potential first
amendment challenges.
IV.

METHODS OF INSTITUTING CONTROL

A. Existing Statutes
While a number of existing laws can be viewed as enabling the
federal government to control biological research, close examination
indicates that these statutes alone do not satisfactorily cure the
problem. One such statute is the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA),77 which requires notification of intended uses of potentially
dangerous chemical substances, to enable the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate their use before any ill effects
occur.78 Testing occurs if the substance presents an unreasonable
environmental or health risk,7 9 or if a previously untested substance
is to be produced in mass quantity or exposed to humans.8 0 If as a
result of testing danger appears imminent, the EPA must undertake
appropriate control procedures through rulemaking.81 Emergency
procedures may be necessary if rulemaking is not feasible due to
time limitations.82 The regulatory procedures are triggered when
the risk of injury appears imminent, rather than when the harm
actually occurs.8
The TSCA appears to be a valid means to control dangerous
biological research because it provides for testing before any damage
is done.a The fact that risk rather than harm is the trigger mechanism allows for regulation at a much earlier stage.
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
78 See Kraus, Environmental Carcinogenesis: Regulation on the Frontiers
77

of

Science, 7 ENvT'L L. 83, 115-16 (1976).
79 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (a) (1) (A) (1976).
8Old. §2603(a)(1)(B)

(1976).

811d. §2603(f) (1976).
See Kraus, supra note 78, at 118-19.
82 Id. § 2604(f) (1) (1976).
8
3 Kraus, supra note 78, at 120.
8
4 The adverse effects of the lack of regulation of biohazards such as recombinant DNA may occur well after their cause, given that scientific understanding of
the subject matter is incomplete and conflicting. By the time they are better understood, they may be dispersed throughout the world. This is analogous in many
ways to the problem of environmental carcinogens. See Kraus, supra note 78, at 85.
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The TSCA is not, however, the proper mechanism to control
this experimentation. Directed to chemical substances 5 the Act
would need to be amended to make it applicable to biological agents
as well. More importantly, the TSCA is directed to testing of a
chemical substance before its commercial production; with recombinant DNA and related topics, the issue is regulation of the basic
research, regardless of potential exploitation. The statute fails to
address the dangers presented by the research itself, and therefore is
an inappropriate vehicle for its regulation.
Also militating against use of the TSCA are its internal problems. The TSCA is a statute of last resort; EPA uses it only when
the public interest requires its use because no other law will solve the
problem. 6 This uncertainty would reduce the efficiency with which
any useful regulation would be administered.
One of the great shortcomings of the TSCA, making it particularly inappropriate to regulate areas like DNA, is that it gives
little guidance as to how its provisions should be applied: "The
TSCA clearly calls for a risk-benefit analysis, yet it does not provide
direction as to how the various factors should be balanced."' St While
it may not always be appropriate or possible for the legislature to
perform the balancing function, 88 it is at least necessary to provide
for some agency or commission particularly suited to interpreting
and applying this standard to the research covered. The failure of
the TSCA, as presently written, to delegate decisionmaking to a
well-qualified body would seem to foreclose the statute's usefulness
in this context.
Another federal statute under which regulations directing biological research may possibly be promulgated is the Public Health
Services Act (PHSA).s9 Under the PHSA, the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare has the power to create and enforce regulations "as in his judgement are necessary to prevent the introduction,
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases [between states or
into the country]." 90 "Since one of the major risks of recombinant
DNA research is that an organism with unknown properties might
be released into the environment and cause an epidemic, regulations
85 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2062 (1976).
86Id.

§§2605(c), 2608(a) & (b) (1976).

See Kraus, supra note 78, at 119.

87 Kraus, supra note 78, at 122 (footnote omitted).
88

See text accompanying notes 106-11 infra.

8942 U.S.C. §§ 262-264 (1970).

9042 U.S.C. §264 (1970).

See generally Balmer, supra note 72.
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to prevent such an occurrence seem to come within the words of
the statute." 91

Despite its superficial applicability, the PHSA is ill-equipped
to act as a basis for regulation of biological research. While it could
be interpreted as allowing for control over the spread of a particular
DNA molecule, 92 because of its language and history it can only
arguably be read as sanctioning regulation over particular types and
classes of experiments. 93 Without control over experimentation itself, the ability to curb potential hazards-and therefore the value of
the regulation-would be limited.
While the Occupational Safety and Health Act,94 (administered

by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)),
might possibly be used to enforce appropriate safety regulations in
the laboratory 05 since it protects against employee injury by employment-related toxic substances 9 6 two immediate problems arise.
First, the Act does not include government employees in its coverage. 97 Many biological researchers would therefore be unprotected.

Second, there is no OSHA coverage over conditions governed by
other federal agencies. 98 Due to the strong possibility that HEW,
NIH, EPA, or some other agency may have authority in this area, it
is inadvisable to use OSHA to promulgate protective regulations.
Environmental pollution statutes may also present an avenue
for control. 99 The problem with such acts, however, is that they are
91 Balmer, supra note 72, at 310-11.
92 Id. 312 n.97. "[Tihe purpose of the section is 'to prevent the spread of
disease,' and regulations reasonably related to that end would be valid." Id. 312.
The broad definition of communicable disease that HEW adopted in connection
with the statute would easily encompass recombinant DNA molecules. Id. See
42 C.F.R. §72.1(b) (1976).
93 Balmer, supra note 72, at 312. "If it could be shown that the likelihood of
the spread of disease was [sic] such that the purpose of the statute could be served
only by prohibition [of experiments], such rules should be upheld." Id. n.97.
The statute is inappropriate, however, because the dangers of biological research
are not confined to the possibility of an epidemic. The PHSA does not address the
basic environmental difficulties presented by such research. Another problem is that
the risks are uncertain, and a risk-benefit calculation must be performed; the PHSA,
however, does not provide for such a balance. Balmer's point is inapposite, for it
cannot be shown with the certainty he desires that the spread of disease will be
caused by some particular research practice.
9429 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
95
See Balmer, supra note 72, at 312 n.99.
9629 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1970). See Kraus, supra note 78, at 92 & n.63.
9729 U.S.C. §§ 652(5) & (6) (1970).

98Id. § 653(b)(1) (1970).
99 See Kraus, supra note 78, at 87-88.

See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857 (1970) (definition of hazardous air pollutant as one which "may cause, or
contribute to, an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness." 42 U.S.C. §1857C-7(a)(1) (1970)); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376. (Supp. III 1973).
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geared toward the discharge of hazardous substances in harmful
quantities.' 0 0 As the controversy over the use of recombinants has
been in large part fueled by the fact that there is no known safe
exposure level to new organisms which the technique may create,
such laws provide no real basis for the promulgation of safety regulations in this area.
B. The Role of Congress
One of the key issues in attempting to regulate potentially
hazardous biological research concerns the respective roles to be
played by the public and by scientists. Once congressional action
is deemed necessary, it must be determined what form such action
should take. Should Congress assume responsibility for the basic
policy decisions, or should it delegate that responsibility to an administrative agency composed of scientists and laymen?
In the past when Congress has legislated in areas involving
considerable factual uncertainty and unclear policy impact, it has
tended to give wide scope to administrative agencies' policy judgments. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for example, is
[authorized to] establish by rule, regulation, or order, such
standards and instructions to govern the possession and use
of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct
material as the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the common defense and security or to
protect health or to minimize danger to life or property.' 01
Similarly broad, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
requires that all federal agencies file a detailed statement of their
activities "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."

102

The various DNA regulation bills in Congress also reflect judgments that significant policymaking in this area should not be done
by legislators. The Rogers, Kennedy, and Nelson bills all delegate
significant decisionmaking to non-legislative bodies, initially to NIH
and eventually to Rogers' and Kennedy's commission103 or Nelson's
advisory committee. 1°4 The Nelson bill, for example, uses language
100 Kraus, supra note 78, at 87-89.
10142 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (1970).

10242 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
103

H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

§ 201 (1978); S. 1217, Amend. No. 1713,

95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1978).
104

S. 1217, Amend. No. 754, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 481 (1977).
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to the effect that regulations should be issued when "necessary for
the protection of health or the environment." 105
Although very much the pattern, this type of delegation should
not automatically be assumed. Judge Bazelon has recently pointed
out that legislatures in democratic societies "traditionally make the
hard value choices. Indeed, this is precisely what [they] are designed
to do." 106 Legislative delegation of this task should be viewed with
caution, since it is not entirely clear that these value choices cannot
be made by Congress in the scientific context. Judge Bazelon points
to the attempts by various city councils and state legislatures to
-regulate DNA research as evidence that "legislatures can become
more involved in scientific and technological disputes whenever they
wish to do so." 107
On the other hand, however, Congress would have considerable
difficulty prescribing explicit standards for regulation of dangerous
biological research much beyond what it has attempted in the proposed recombinant DNA legislation. Legislative intervention in
other contexts has been considered likely to be inflexible and interfere with efficient government; 108 congressional activism, particularly
in the case of DNA, could be unproductive because of the constantly
changing state of knowledge about the subject, its attendant dangers,
and the resulting need to constantly reconsider and alter specific
proscriptions.10 9 As Judge Bazelon has suggested, "[i]t is not very
practical to expect a relative handful of legislators somehow to keep
tabs on all the wide-ranging and complex activities in which the
government is involved today." 110
One thing the legislature can do is establish the importance
with which the basic problem is viewed. While the legislature may
not have the time, skills, or rapid information exchange necessary
to constantly weigh in timely fashion the risks and benefits of a
particular procedure, especially one in a state of flux, it can provide
a general evaluation of what it sees as the benefits of the particular
research. This is a common feature of the DNA bills. Other than
that, in balancing the need for efficient administrative action against
the concern for democratically based value judgments, the language
105 Id. § 474(a)(4).
l06Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CoTELrr.
L. REv. 817, 829 (1977).
107

Id. 830.

los See generally K. DAvis, ADmiisnRATIw LAw OF TE SEvENTEs, §§ 200-17

(1976).
109 See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 supra.

21o Bazelon, supra note 106, at 829.
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of regulatory legislation should be left general, and other methods
sought to ensure what Bazelon and others have called "interest
representation." 111
C. Creation of a Regulatory Framework
Proper implementation of new legislation governing control of
biologically hazardous experimentation requires a suitable administrative framework which not only encompasses scientists capable of
evaluating any technical data involved, but also laymen capable of
representing the public at large in the value choices inherent in
regulation.1 2 No existing agency, even though it may have been
13
mentioned as a possible regulator of recombinant DNA research,"
has the proper "interest representation" 114 to make the difficult
value and policy choices necessary for adequate regulation.
In establishing a commission to regulate potentially dangerous
experimentation, Congress should consider the composition of other
bodies which make policy decisions based on uncertain scientific or
technological risks. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which
develops standards to safeguard the use of nuclear energy, has a
membership of five. Two of the commissioners have backgrounds
in science and/or technology.1 5 One of the nonscientists has a
background in public utility regulation, while the other has had
national security planning experience. 116
Another agency whose membership might act as a guide is the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, created in 1974 to study the risks
III Id.
112

One important consideration in attempting to make a value choice is the

ease with which that choice can be made. This, in turn, is a function of the degree
to which "benefit" and "risk" can be quantified. For a debate on this issue, see
Green, supra note 24; Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific
Base for Government Regulation, 43 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 808 (1975).
113 The EPA has been mentioned as a possible body to regulate research on
recombinant DNA, given its experience in technical rulemaking under various
pollution control statutes. See Balmer, supra note 72, at 308-10. The Office of
Technology Assessment has also been mentioned because it analyzes scientific issues
for congressional committees, although its focus is primarily on the physical rather
than the biological sciences. Capron, Reflections on Issues Posed by Recombinant
DNA Molecule Technology. Il, in ETHcAL AN SCIENTIFTC Isstus PosED BY
HutmAN UsEs OF MoLEcuILA GENTEcrcs, 265 ANNALs N.Y. AcAD. Scr. 71, 74-76
(1976).
4
11 See text accompanying note 111 supra.
115 The backgrounds of the Commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were described by a staff member of the NRC (information on file, U. PA.
L. REv.).
116

Id.
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and benefits of research on human subjects 117 and to make recommendations to the Secretary of HEW for the development of governing guidelines." 8 Recognizing the need for diverse perspectives,
the statute which created the Commission mandated that it be composed of eleven persons from the various fields of "medicine, law,
ethics, theology, the biological, physical, behavioral and social
sciences, philosophy, humanities, health administration, government,
and public affairs." 119
The most recent House bill, 20 sponsored by Representative
Rogers, follows very closely the framework of the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Although basically an interim
measure, 12 the bill does establish a Commission for the Study of
Research and Technology Involving Genetic Manipulation. 2 2 The
thirteen members would be selected by the Secretary of HEW from
the fields of "medicine, law, ethics, the biological, physical, and
environmental sciences, philosophy, humanities, health administration, government, and public affairs." 123 The mandate of this
Commission would be to study current federal policy towards, and
the long-term consequences of, recombinant DNA technology, and
make recommendations about the appropriate federal response to
such activities.12-

Senator Kennedy's bill provides for a similar

commission consisting of eleven persons, six of whom would be nonbiologists drawn from the categories listed in the Rogers bill, and
five of whom would be professional biological researchers.'2 5 The
bill proposed by Senator Nelson would also provide for some diversity of background, both in the membership of the "Local Biohazard
Committee" 120 which would enforce the law, and the "Advisory
117 See Smith, supra note 44, at 721-22.

The Commission was created by the

National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974)
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1974)).
118 See Smith, supra note 44, at 721-22.
11942 U.S.C. §218(f) (Supp. IV 1974).
120 H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).

(codified In

121 Id. § 102. Title I of the bill is entitled "Interim Regulation of Recombinant DNA Activities."
122 Id. § 201.
123 Id. § 201(b) (1).
124

Id. §§ 202, 204(b).
1217, Amend. No. 1713, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §§201(b)(1) & (2)

1255.

(1978).
126 S.

1217, Amend. No. 754, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 476(d)(1) (1977).
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Committee," which would have the primary responsibility of mak27
ing recommendations to the Secretary of HEW.
The use of a mixed body of scientists and laymen is not the
only means of assuring that adequate "interest representation" is
maintained. Indeed, it may not even be a particularly effective
method if it is true, as some have argued, that lay members of such
28 It
panels give too much weight to the scientists' determinations.
is also conceivable that over time laymen may tend to sympathize
with the scientific point of view and lose their sense of objectivity.
The use of appropriate administrative procedures will be an
effective method of ensuring that the decisions made by any regulatory commission set up to guard against biohazards are properly
reflective of the interests of both the scientists being regulated and
the public at large.
Administrative procedures fall into roughly two categories: rulemaking and adjudication. 129 Rulemaking has been described as a
"quasi-legislative procedure" 180 requiring either the receipt of comments from the public or an oral hearing with a record. 131 Adjudication is "quasi-judicial" in that it includes trial-type hearings in
which an agency enforces specific regulations. 32 Considering the
nature of the issues involved, it is, on balance, more appropriate for
the proposed regulatory commission to use rulemaking procedures
rather than adjudication. Although scholars are not in agreement
as to which procedure is best suited to the promulgation of major
policies, 33 rulemaking seems to be better suited to the resolution of
issues growing out of uncertain scientific risks. 134 Though adjudi127 Id. § 481. The committee would consist of 17 members, one of whom
would represent non-professional laboratory employees, one commercial researcher,
nine people not concerned with recombinant DNA (at least four of whom would
be scientists who could evaluate health risks), one public health expert, one ethicist,
and three representatives of the general public. Id.
128 Martin, supra note 24, at 1067.
129 Rulemaking is governed by § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
Adjudication is governed by § 554, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
130 Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J.
359, 369 (1972).
131 Id. 369-70.
132 Id. 371.

133 See, e.g., Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HA~v. L. REv. 921 (1965).

134 See Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure
Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 401, 403-11 (1975);

Comment, Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act Through Rulemaking: The Implications of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 126 U. PA. L. Rlv. 148, 161 (1977).
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cation may be a superior method of ascertaining particular facts 135

it does not supply the more generalized mechanisms needed to resolve value conflicts. 36 The expensive and time-consuming procedural requirements of adjudication which are designed to ensure
accurate proceedings are less significant when the basic issues are, as
here, not susceptible to proof. 3 7 Rulemaking, on the other hand,
has fewer procedural safeguards, but this is because it is less concerned with individual situations; it seeks instead to draw broad
Rulemaking is
conclusions about a large number of episodes. 13
preferable to adjudication in this context because it is better suited
to extensive public participation 139 and offers greater flexibility in
140
the decisionmaking process.
The proposed regulatory agency should make use of those types
of rulemaking best adapted to public participation. "Rulemaking
on a record" 141 is rulemaking in which the agency's decision is based
on what transpires at an oral hearing. This type of procedure may
involve some problems of public participation, depending on the
142
number of parties directly involved and the nature of the issue.
"Notice and Comment Rulemaking" allows for greater presentation
of public views. The agency proposes tentative rules and seeks
comments from interested parties. 143 One difficulty with this procedure has been in deciding how best to inform the public that
44
changes are being considered and that their comments are desired.
Given the complexities of regulation of biohazards and the great
need for public participation and representation in the basic policy
and value choices which must be made, the regulatory body should
not be bound by traditional conceptions of rulemaking. Judge
Bazelon has pointed to the attempts by Secretary of Transportation
William Coleman and NIH Director Donald Fredrickson to involve
the public in their respective decisions on the SST and the NIH
Guidelines on recombinant DNA research as evidence of open de135 It would be for this reason that a regulatory commission would use adjudi-

cation in a proceeding such as licensing an installation to do particular research.
136 Williams, supra note 134, at 407-08.
137 Id. 407.
138 Id. 406.
139 Cranton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participationin
the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525, 535-36 (1972). See Comment, AEC
Rulemaking and Public Participation,62 GEo. L.J. 1737 (1974).
140 Williams, supra note 134, at 408-09.
14 1 See 5 U.S.C. §§556 & 557 (1970).

142 See Gellhorn, supra note 130, at 370.
143 See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
144 Gellhom, supra note 130, at 369.
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cisionmaking which went beyond the bare minimum of the Administrative Procedure Act, and were sensitive to the value of public
participation. 145 Intensive solicitation of comments from public interest groups and suitable opportunity for their presentation may be
the first steps toward greater accountability.1 4"
In addition to being innovative in their search for public participation, the commissioners of the new agency may also consider
using new techniques to resolve whatever factual issues they may
confront. Use of a "science court" to resolve close technical issues
regarding the risks of particular procedures may be appropriate.
The basic premise of the science court concept is that items of
disputed scientific "fact" can be argued by scientists in an adversary
proceeding before a panel of scientist-judges. 147 The "court's". judgment as to scientific "fact" would then be used by the regulatory
body as one piece of evidence in the risk/benefit balance which
148
must be struck.
One benefit of the science court concept is that it creates a
division of power between scientists on the one hand and those
charged with deciding policy on the other. It allows for finality of
scientific judgments, which leads to a better informed policy decision. 149 The dangers are that the science court's determination
may be too rigid, 150 and that too much importance will be attached
to it.','
The effectiveness of such a device in the context of biological
research is highly questionable. 15 2 As Judge Bazelon has pointed
out, not all disputes are amenable to the science court process.' 53
When, as with DNA research, the "facts" are likely to remain conjectural and constantly changing, the "court's" judgment will be
continuously open to challenge. Some problems are inevitably
145 Bazelon, supra note 106, at 824.
146 Id. See text accompanying notes 17-19, supra. Even though the NIH
consulted with several public interest groups, the result remained scientific self-

regulation.

Similar actions must be taken by a mixed body composed of scientists

and those better able to make objective value judgments.
47 Boffey, Experiment Planned to Test Feasibility of a "Science Court," 193
Scr. 129 (1976). See Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An
Interim Report, 193 Sci. 653 (1976).
148 Boffey, supra note 147.
149 Martin, supra note 24, at 1064.

1U0 Id. 1084-85.
151 Bazelon, supra note 106, at 826-27.

See id.; Martin, supra note 24.
153 Bazelon, supra note 106.
152
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"trans-scientific," 154 requiring policy decisions based on value-laden
assumptions which cannot be separated from questions of fact.
Thus a regulatory commission, composed of both scientists and
laymen, utilizing, but not limited to, notice and comment rulemaking, with special efforts to gain public participation, is the appropriate administrative mechanism for the regulation of biological
research.
V. CONCLUSION

Recombinant DNA techniques present a dilemma. On the
one hand, they present means of potentially solving problems in
cancer research and increasing human knowledge about genetics and
inheritance. At the same time, they present an uncertain danger to
man's health and environment. Other areas of biological research
present similar problems of great potential benefits balanced against
uncertain but grave risks. Because of the dangers involved, a regulatory response is mandated, directed not only at recombinant DNA
but also at other "biohazards."
A regulatory response to the "biohazard" problem must provide
a means of making the basic value choices implicit in any risk/benefit
calculus. Scientists, acting alone, are an inappropriate group to
perform this balance; they are unable to determine in the name of
the public those risks that are worth tolerating.
Because scientists comprise the only group with the technical
expertise to ascertain the risks, however, their advice and participation in regulation is essential. For this reason, federal regulation
is more appropriate than control at the state or local level; the federal government is better able to keep abreast of the latest scientific
advances. Furthermore, federal regulation would avoid the problem of "balkanization" which would result from a piecemeal alm/
proach to a problem with potentially wide-ranging consequences.
The federal government should therefore preempt all regulation
of biohazards.
In order to avoid successful constitutional challenge, the congressional scheme should be narrowly drawn, regulating only procedures and not dissemination of knowledge. While the scientific
community has a possible first amendment interest in not having its
research curtailed at all, the government can justify its intrusion as
incidental regulation of actions of researchers in the course of protecting the public safety.
154 Id.
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A new statute, specifically directed to the biohazard problem,
is needed. Because of the complex nature of the subject matter
being regulated, as well as its ever-changing nature, Congress should
delegate much of its decisionmaking power to a new regulatory body
composed of both scientists and laymen responsive to the public
interest. This new agency should utilize those rulemaking procedures which are best suited to maximizing public participation in
the decisionmakilg process.

